The US-Iran conflict is being fought primarily at sea, not on land. The Strait of Hormuz has emerged as the central arena. Economic warfare, and naval blockages accompanied by occasional missile and drone strikes define the contest. Both sides tend to avoid massive ground invasion. This makes the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan (19th Century US Admiral), and Basil Liddell Hart (2Oth century British inter-war historian) highly relevant. Mahan stressed command of the sea and decisive fleet engagements. Hart championed the "indirect approach"- avoiding frontal clashes and attacking the enemy's weak points, making up for the asymmetry in actual capabilities. Neither side is, however, set to copy these thinkers. Their actions stem from practical necessities, geography, and institutional habits. Yet the strategic parallels are uncanny.

The United States, wittingly or not, follows a Mahanian template. It has deployed overwhelming naval force. Carrier strike groups dominating the Persian Gulf. The US fleet is enforcing a tight blockade, intending to strangle Iran's economy, though not achieving the goal. Nonetheless, President Trump has called it a "wall of steel". This posture reflects Mahan's core belief. That sea -power secures national victory. Yet there is a critical difference. The US does not seek Mahan's decisive, climactic battle. It avoids destroying Iranian capabilities in a single engagement. It refrains from bombing desalination plants or seizing islands. Washington used its naval supremacy as a coercive deterrent. It applies pressure without pursuing total annihilation. Thus, while its capabilities are Mahanian, its application is restrained , not necessarily because of any warfighting ethical conformity , but due to perceived operational and rational dictates.

Iran, by contrast, embodies Liddell Hart's indirect approach with precision. Teheran may not consciously invoke the British historian, but its asymmetries leave few alternatives. It knows it cannot match US firepower. It avoids direct naval confrontation. Instead, it strikes where the US is the weakest, such as at US bases in the Gulf (Hart had advocated the striking at the enemy's "vulnerable extremities"" to cause moral and physical dislocation). Iran uses empathetic militias across the region. The Houthis attack Saudi oil facilities. Hezbollah threatens US ally Israel's northern border. Iraqi Shia groups target US bases. Iran also harasses commercial shipping in the Straits; these actions impose cumulative costs. Tehran seeks to break American will through prolongation. A senior Iranian official explicitly stated that the goal is to stretch the war past Trump's term. This is classic Liddell Hart: avoid the enemy's centre of gravity, multiply fronts, and erode morale indirectly. Iran is not necessarily reading Liddell Hart in a war room. But its material limitations force it into this asymmetric mode.

Israel fits briefly into this picture. It co-initiated the 28 February 26 strikes alongside the US. Its action in Lebanon keeps the Pakistani mediated Memorandum of Understanding on hold. However, its not the primary naval actor. The US holds the dominant maritime role. Israel sharpens the threat but does not alter the fundamental strategic dynamic. The core contest remains between American sea power and Iranian asymmetry.

The other big powers China and Russia, offer Iran a diplomatic and economic lifeline. Both oppose US sanctions. They provide trade channels outside the US dollar. If Iran sells oil to China or India, the US blockade loses effectiveness. China and Russia would be happy to see US munitions diminish, having the Pacific and Ukraine in view. Though all three-China, Russia, India are members of BRICS and it is tempting to see BRICS as a key player of the Global South in a more major role , the grouping is too diverse to have a coordinated position on the US-Iran conflict. The conflict remains a bilateral strategic struggle.

The prognosis for this conflict remains is a protracted stalemate. The US has not been able to translate sea control into political victory. While the blockade has hurt Iran's economy, it has not Tehran to surrender. Iran's proxies continue to strike regional targets. Shipping through the Straits has plummeted, and the Strait of Hormuz, open before the war, is now largely closed. Oil prices remain high, fuelling domestic discontent in America, with possible implications for the upcoming US midterm elections. America's failure to achieve the stated war goals, have led many strategists to declare the result of the conflict, this "war of choice" as a clear win for Iran. But some might also see this as a hasty extrapolation. The US seems to be as yet unwilling to abandon its naval posture. This would prevent either side from achieving a decisive victory, though the fact that a change in political architecture of the region appears imminent, gives Iran the upper hand.

The change is, among other things, reflected in the recently concluded Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed on 7 August 2026.Saudi Arabia with its financial resources, Türkiye with its massive military production base and a, nuclear-armed Pakistan pledged mutual defence. An attack on one is considered an attack on all. The commitments, somewhere between Article 5 of NATO and 51 of the UN Charter, is intentionally kept vague so as to keep the trigger unclear. But there is no doubt that a threat on one which is deemed existential would be responded to by all three. While the US has close bilateral links with each, has not opposed the deal, perhaps sensing it as an inexorable shift. It is profound because it demonstrated that regional states are no longer able to rely on the US security umbrella. They are diversifying their alliances. A new security architecture is emerging that recognises a declining US guarantee, and an erosion of American interest and influence. At some point in time, it might even include Iran, giving it the character of 'Collective Security'. A US assent is possible if it can help resolve America's dilemmas.

In conclusion, the US -Iran conflict illustrates both the powers and limits of classical strategy. The US wields Mahanian Sea power- unwittingly perhaps, but effectively, its currently revealed supply chain issues to the ships including the Carrier "Abraham Lincoln" notwithstanding. But it lacks the will and wherewithal to convert it into a knockout blow. Iran practices Liddell Hart's indirect warfare-again unintentionally, but with skill, sharpened and honed by millennia of sea fighting experience: One recalls how the ancient Persians, along with their Greek adversaries, had utilised the 'trireme'- a fast, bronze-ramming warship p0wered by three banks of oars!

While we may fail to see as the most significant outcome of the conflict in a clear victory for either side, what will surely happen is a fundamental realignment of regional alliances. In a region where civilisation first took roots, we will relearn that the winner is not always the stronger, but the one with, what the Homeric Greeks called, 'metis'- a combination of cunning intelligence, craft, skill and wiliness! The Mecca Agreement might symbolise the beginnings of new order. It is a paradigm shift, one born out of the current chaos, shifting notions of sovereignty, with big powers focused on protecting mainly their own interests, and weakened international institutions unable any longer to discharge their global responsibilities. Yet it is one where the innate desire of most nations and peoples is to find new and often innovative ways to survive, and if and when possible, to thrive and prosper!

Ambassador Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury (Retd.), PhD, President, Cosmos Foundation, Dhaka. Former Foreign Advisor, Bangladesh Caretaker Government.