Control of Russia's private military company Wagner is likely to fall to the country's Ministry of Defence, with several Wagner veterans already having signed with the ministry or its other affiliated military firms, sources within the group have said.

But questions remain about how far the Russian MoD will be able to integrate with private military company (PMC) Wagner, which has operations across the Middle East and Africa, with answers likely varying from country to country.

It is a week since the plane crash that killed Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin and a number of other top brass from the controversial military outfit.

PMC Wagner's defining feature was a lack of any formal structure. Wagner was a social phenomenon as well as a product of Vladimir Putin's system of governance and international demand. Prigozhin thrived in an environment where Russia's political elites had disproportionate freedom to pursue foreign policy, and his PMC was well placed to profit from global trends in the privatisation of warfare.

While Wagner shared much in common with past PMCs like South Africa's Executive Outcomes or Blackwater in the US, it more reflected a historic Russian system of governance in miniature.

In the centre sat Prigozhin, surrounded by a loyal cadre who fanned out in search of opportunity. Guidance was not always forthcoming, and it was common for two or more teams inside the organisation to compete with each other. Prigozhin ruled at the strategic level. At the tactical level, Wagner's Council of Commanders was the foundational mechanism for decision-making.

This mechanism ensures that Wagner could maintain existing operations without the centre for some time. But in the week that followed Prigozhin's death, the Russian MoD under Sergey Shoigu has been moving quickly to alter the status quo.

Wagner's Council of Commanders has failed to nominate a new leader, despite the availability of several capable individuals. It seems likely Shoigu's ministry will not allow the leadership of Wagner to pass to an unknown entity. Wagner's new sponsor will likely be someone close to Shoigu, the only person to emerge from Prigozhin's "March of Justice" stronger than before.

Shoigu is a political survivor and an expert in the games inherent to government staffing. He has considerable experience acquiring and subordinating commercial enterprises to his needs, and those politically close to him have their own business empire and lieutenants. In short, like Prigozhin did, he runs his own miniature governance system.

Shoigu will have little interest in dismantling Wagner. Since 2017, Wagner has been one of the country's most successful exports. To shut down Wagner in Africa, for example, would be tantamount to losing Moscow's influence on the continent.

Shoigu will ensure, however, that Wagner's relationship to the MoD changes. According to one source in Wagner: "The MoD will take control. The real question is whether they'll be effective."

Those close to Shoigu at the MoD who take over the running of Wagner will have to choose between keeping Prigozhin's old team and appointing their own, the source believes. But, they added: "It will take a lot of time for them to figure out how everything works. In the meantime, they'll have to keep Prigozhin's guys happy."

Wagner's touchpoints with the MoD and its intelligence unit, known by its older acronym the GRU, always occurred at the upper echelons. Prigozhin's main point of contact in the MoD was first deputy minister of defence Ruslan Tsalikov, who also happens to figure prominently in Shoigu's own empire. It therefore seems likely that the passing of Wagner from one kurator to another could be sealed with a handshake, not a pen.

How Wagner's subordination to the Russian MoD will play out on the ground depends on country and context. In Syria, where the MoD has its own presence and a history of kicking out Wagner, there is capacity to change personnel. There are reports that Syrian officials had already told Wagner to integrate with the Russian army or leave by October.

In Libya, meanwhile, deputy defence minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov visited a key general, Khalifa Haftar, on 22 August - the day before the crash that killed Prigozhin - and allegedly discussed Wagner while there. Libya, however, was always contractor territory. Any significant changes in personnel will take more time.

Some of Wagner's top officers will surely bristle at the prospect of signing a contract with the MoD. But in the end, most have bills to pay and families to feed, and a sizeable number of Wagner veterans have already signed with the MoD or its affiliated military companies, according to several sources.

In countries like the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali, the MoD neither has the personnel nor the knowledge to replace Wagner anytime soon. While there are rumours that MoD-affiliated PMCs, such as PMC Redut or PMC Convoy, are recruiting for Africa, this is likely not feasible in the short-term. One source in PMC Redut, who previously served in Wagner, noted "Redut" has become little more than an umbrella term for distinct volunteer units in Ukraine. While it's possible a version of PMC Redut could become active in Africa, they said, "it's unlikely they'll replace Wagner entirely".

A rebrand of Wagner for Africa is more feasible. Changing the name but keeping the personnel is common in the industry. And several Wagner sources in Africa have confirmed they will continue going to work.

Indeed, for the average Russian mercenary, little will change. Fixed-term contracts to serve in CAR, Mali, Libya, Syria, and perhaps new countries will continue to be available. Wagner used to blacklist those who moved on to other PMCs like Redut, but still people quit and moved on. In the end, the Russian mercenary community is small, and while the names often change, the faces stay the same.

From openDemocracy