The joint National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI) Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) deployed to Bangladesh to monitor potential electoral violence conditions before, during, and after the country's January 7, 2024 parliamentary elections released its final report this week.

According to the organisations' own statement, the document provides a thematic analysis of different types of election violence and includes recommendations to the Bangladesh Election Commission, the executive and legislative branches of government, political parties, civil society, and other stakeholders based on IRI's and NDI's comparative experience, to mitigate the risks of violence in future elections, in the furtherance of international cooperation and with respect for the sovereignty of Bangladesh.

The mission found that the 2024 election period, including the campaign period, election day and immediate aftermath, had less physical and online violence compared to previous election cycles, primarily due to the absence of nationwide partisan competition and the state's increased focus on election security. However, the TAM also found that the quality of the January election was undermined by incidents of state, ruling party, and opposition violence, as well as a pre-election environment characterised by increased political polarisation, violence among political actors, contracting civic space, and worsening freedoms of expression and association.

"This report provides a valuable roadmap for more peaceful elections in Bangladesh's future," said Manpreet Singh Anand, NDI's Regional Director for the Asia-Pacific. "Leaders across the sociopolitical spectrum - including political parties, the government, and civil society - have a responsibility to reform the rules, practices, and norms of electoral politics toward nonviolence."

"Election violence is a key deterrent of citizen participation," said Johanna Kao, IRI's Senior Director for the Asia-Pacific Division. "For Bangladesh's elections to be fully inclusive and participatory, all sides need to prioritise nonviolent politics."

During its stay in Bangladesh, the TAM's five accredited long-term analysts met with election and government officials, security actors, political party leaders from across the political spectrum, journalists, civil society organisations including those focusing on youth, women, persons with disabilities, and religious minorities, as well as with accredited international observer missions.

This mission follows a joint pre-election assessment mission (PEAM) that NDI and IRI conducted from October 8 to 11, 2023. The observations from the PEAM informed the structure and scope of the technical assessment, which was conducted in accordance with the laws of Bangladesh and consistent with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation, endorsed in 2005 at the United Nations.

IRI and NDI are US-based nonpartisan, nongovernmental organisations that work to support and strengthen democratic institutions and practices worldwide. The Institutes have collectively observed more than 200 elections in more than 50 countries over the last 30 years.

The day after the report's release, Foreign Minister Hasan Mahmud said the government was examining the observations made in the NDI-IRI report, as well as those made by other friendly countries and other entities.

He also pointed out that the joint NDI and IRI mission in its report acknowledges that the January 7 election witnessed less violence compared to previous polls.

The quality of the election was much better than the previous ones in Bangladesh or other countries in the subcontinent, he said.

"A fair and good election was held," said the minister while responding to a question at the Foreign Service Academy, according to our sister newsagency UNB.

Hasan Mahmud said the NDI and IRI have presented their statement. "We are looking into that. But a beautiful, fair, free and impartial election was held in the country."

"The BNP and their allies did not only boycott the election but also tried to resist it... they should also address this issue," Hasan said.

He said the BNP incited violence and people were burnt and killed. "These issues have to be there in the report."

Responding to a question on whether the government is rejecting the report, the minister said it is not a matter of rejection or acceptance.

"They have given the report, we are looking into it, and we are examining all the observations made by our friendly countries and anyone else," Hasan said.

In conclusion

NDI-IRI of course tied themselves in, by limiting their mission to that of a technical assessment on electoral violence. It forced them into the roundabout conclusion that Jan 7 was a less violent election, "primarily due to the absence of nationwide partisan competition", even as it restates the obvious: "Election violence is a key deterrent of citizen participation."

Which comes first though? The violence, or the participation/competition?

In making its comparison with previous election cycles, the report states: "Bangladesh has a long history of political violence, which spikes during election years. Both the 2014 and 2018 elections were marked by political and electoral violence, with estimates of approximately 500 and 100 deaths, respectively, in the year prior to election day."

Should the report have limited itself to comparison with just the two most recent elections, that were themselves tainted? If it had gone further back, it would have found more mixed, but more telling answers. By applying the same yardstick, it could've found evidence in the 1991 and 2008 elections at least, that when all political parties reach a consensus about electoral administration, then the violence rate becomes less in number. In an election environment characterised by the use of violence, obviously a more competitive environment can induce more violent competition.

Should we forego competitive elections though, in favour of non-violent ones? Does it quite work like that? The problem with the TAM, and this was always foreseeable of course, is that violence is always a symptom, and by limiting itself to the symptom of the disease, it prevented itself from ever getting to the heart of the matter. As such, it is unable to offer much that can be said to be constructive towards the better conduct of future elections in Bangladesh.

For it to then be beneficial, there has to be a more forensic examination of the violence, and a more thorough comparison of the violence between each cycle to arrive at any less/more statements. You have to characterise the violence in each cycle, and state it for comparison. You can't just say the 2014 and 2018 elections had 500 and 100 deaths. Was there a preponderance of violence from one side? Were the state security agencies engaged in deliberate violence? Was there a preponderance on behalf of the state?

Without delving deeper to answer these questions, the recommendations lose their punch.

It was even more surprising that having quoted that yardstick (deaths in political and electoral violence in the year prior to election day), it didn't state a number at all for how the 2024 cycle compared. There is no aggregate figure provided, although individual incidents in which deaths occurred (such as say October 28) are mentioned. Surely it could have arrived at some figure.