The Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) inability to secure a majority of seats in the Lok Sabha, the Lower House of Parliament, has resulted in Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi having to lead a coalition government. This development appears to have caused a degree of disquiet among his supporters, who are accustomed to the steely, single-minded determination with which Mr Modi has sought to rule a nation as vast and as diverse as India. His detractors are happy, of course, and are hoping that he will stumble because of the need to share executive power with the BJP's partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).

What is apparent is that Mr Modi will have to adapt his ruling style to suit the realities of the new parliamentary situation. Temperamentally, he is decisive, expects his orders to be obeyed, and is impatient with the inefficient and the tardy. These are good qualities in an administrator, and he is after all the chief administrator of India.

Politically, though, these qualities could prove to be troublesome. Coalition dharma, as it is called in India, rests on the ability of members to negotiate continuously and strike working compromises within the ambit of a common minimum programme. This dharma does not come naturally to Mr Modi because he did not need to practise it during the two previous phases of his premiership, Modi 1.0 from 2014 to 2019 and Modi 2.0 from 2019 to 2024. Modi 3.0 will have to witness a reconstitution of the person who also is a phenomenon in Indian politics.

This is no bad thing. India's astonishing shift to the religious right under the BJP dispensation occurred as quickly and as deeply as it did because of the landslide victories that the party had won at the ballot. The BJP had no need to accommodate the contrarian opinions of even allies. Things are different now. The BJP's two main allies - the Telugu Desam Party of Andhra Pradesh and the Janata Dal (United) of Bihar - are headed by two leaders, Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar, masters at political bargaining who have demanded special concessions for their state as the price for supporting the BJP at the Centre.

More important, neither of them shares the Hindutva leanings, let along the Hindutva agenda, of the BJP. They are essentially secular politicians whose aspirations are limited to the practice of temporal power, not the pursuit of mass religious salvation. They can be expected to act as a brake on radical policies touching on religion that the BJP had wished to pursue during Modi 3.0.

A prime example would be the planned introduction of a uniform civil code that would have superseded the faith-based personal laws of the minorities. It is difficult to see the Telugu Desam Party and the Janata Dal (United) supporting a policy that would badly alienate minorities that support them back in their home states. At the end of the day, all politics is local.

All in all, India's new coalition government could represent a pivot back to the traditional centre of national politics. If the government lasts, it would take the edge off the abrasive confessional politics that has entered the electoral mainstream over the past decade. At the same time, the new government would not be weakened institutionally since Mr Modi has retained the key figures from the last administration in his new Cabinet, trustworthy lieutenants who occupy the critical posts of Home, Finance, Defence and External Affairs. The balance between old hands and new realities points to stability in national affairs.

Foreign Relations

India's stability would be good for its external partners, beginning with its neighbours. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's attendance at Mr Modi's swearing-in ceremony attested to the importance that India and Bangladesh mutually place on their bilateral ties. As with any bilateral (or even multilateral) relationship, ties might come under strain from time to time for one reason or the other, but the key requirement is that each side recognise the importance of the other sides to its own well-being.

In that context, India is a balancing power in South Asia. New Delhi has moved away from the Indira Doctrine, which required India's neighbours to effectively route their ties with extra-regional powers through India. The Gujral Doctrine broke with that hegemonic principle, thus setting in place a trend of improving regional relations that allowed New Delhi to normalise its bilateral relationships with its neighbours without giving up its demographic, economic and military centrality in its immediate region. The Modi Doctrine, if there is one, builds on the Gujral Doctrine more than it seeks to recreate the Indira Doctrine.

India's relations with China fall into another category: contestation between great powers. China's refusal to accept India as a peer Asian power, and India's countermanding decision to welcome Western (primarily American) intervention in Asian affairs as a balancing mechanism vis-à-vis China should not be affected dramatically by the emergence of Modi 3.0. The Chinese political system has achieved a high level of internal and external efficiency owing to the absence of adversarial electoral politics. India has come into its global own in spite of the presence of exactly the kind of electoral politics that can produce a surprise coalition government. The ideological tussle between these two key Asian great powers will continue.

Democratic countries such as Bangladesh will need to continue with balance-of-power policies that do not alienate any major international partner without falling into the trap of being so subservient to one partner that another partner gives up its stake in the country. Dhaka's good relations with both New Delhi and Beijing offer reason to hope that Bangladesh is not taken hostage in the battle of the great powers, which includes, of course, the United States.

India's stability enhances the security of South Asia. In that spirit, Bangladesh's diplomatic outreach would no doubt continue to include seeking good relations with the dispensation in New Delhi.

The writer is Principal Research Fellow at the Cosmos Foundation.