When the World Trade Organization replaced the earlier General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) in 1994, a torch was of hope for prosperity among nations was rekindled. Few global bodies generate the kind of passions that the WTO does. Meetings of the WTO Ministerial Council, the highest decision-making body of the organization, are inevitably accompanied by huge protests in host cities. It is mainly because its detractors see it, albeit a tad unfairly, as having altered little from that of GATT, which was widely, and in this case perhaps, fairly, seen as a 'Rich Men's Club'.

But the fact is that the two are different in many ways. First, in their mandates; GATT dealt with only trading in goods, while the WTO covers the newer areas of services and intellectual property as well. Second, GATT was smaller with 128 member nations, while the WTO is universal with its membership numbering 164 States, including socialist China , which used to hold the GATT in contempt. Third, while GATT ignored development, WTO embraced it, inextricably linking trade with development.

The WTO rests upon a tripod. One leg is the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods (including GATT and associated agreements); the second is the General Agreement of Trades ibn Services (GATS); and the third is the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS).The Ministerial Council, which is the apex forum for decision -making, and which meets every two years, is sustained by three structures; first , the General Council , comprising Ambassadors of member nations . The General Council, akin to a central legislature, has also two other avatars or manifestations. One is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which does just that, that is tries to settle disputes, and the other the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), which examines WTO-consistency of the trade policies of Member-States. The second sustaining structure is a set of Committees, each focussed on a major WTO function, including the Committee on Trade and Development (Comm TD). The third is the Secretariat, headed by the Director General, which exerts enormous influence, often in consultation with key players in the 'Green room'.

The WTO System is based on certain principles, of which some are key. First, protection can be provided to domestic production against foreign competition only by tariffs and not by any quantitative restrictions; second, these tariffs should be reduced in due course, and non- tariff barriers (NTBs), eliminated. Third, all members must accord one another 'Most Favoured Nation' (MFN) status, or equal treatment. Fourth, 'national treatment' is to be accorded to all, meaning no distinction is to be made between imported and domestic products. Fifth, services transactions were to occur in four modes, including the free movement of 'natural persons' (mode 4). And Sixth, Intellectual Property Rights, which include patents, copyrights and industrial designs, are to be protected complementing the agreements developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).

The multilateral legal instruments, which constitute the WTO system, are treated as a 'single undertaking'. This implies that, in one stroke, it makes all subject to the Agreements to be implemented, albeit with varied responsibilities, as some States are eligible for 'Special and Differential Treatment (SDT). This is particularly true those known as 'developing countries' because of their low-level of development. This exception was to become an apple of discord among member-states, as 'developing countries' were 'self-declared', and included China, South Korea and the like, to the chagrin of some, notably President Donald Trump of the United States.

The fruition of WTOs aspirations was to be achieved in various global rounds of negotiations. The latest called the Doha Development Round sadly came to naught for several reasons. These included differences on a variety of issues such as agriculture, industrial tariffs, NTBs, services and trade remedies. The most significant differences were between developed countries led by the US, the European Union (EU) , and Japan, and the developing countries led by China , Brazil , India , and South Africa. Also significant were gaps between the US and the EU, pre-dating Mr Trump, but exacerbating since then, on, particularly, the use of subsidies. However, the evolving 'mother of battles' that now has become an existential threat to the WTO is the burgeoning trade war between the US and China.

Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have for sometime existed alongside the WTO, some like the EU even predating the latter. Actually, the WTO allows for such derogation from its principles through GATT Article XXIX and GATS Article V, though the language have been kept deliberately vague. The Doha Round actually vetted those, only adding some clauses. The impasse at the Doha Round gave this phenomenon additional fillip. Free marketeers like Professor Jagdish Bhagwati had always been critical of this phenomenon, terming it the 'spaghetti bowl problem', referring to the intertwined agreements. The Asian counterpart has been called the 'noodle-bowl' phenomenon. In Asia when RTAs were spurred on initially by the Financial Crisis of 1997, but has now gathered momentum as the US turns inwards, deepening the perception of a neglect of a rising South and East Asia. The latest 'noodle-bowl' example is the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership' (RCEP).

In its planned form, the RCEP will cover sixteen countries-the ten ASEAN nations together with China, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, a massive collection of States, contributing a third of the world's Gross National Product(GDP).It would have been sealed at the ASEAN Summit of Bangkok earlier this month, but has been held back due to Indian wariness. Indian small industry worries about being overwhelmed by cheaper Chinese manufactures, and farmers about being flooded with dairy products from Australia and New Zealand. There is talk of untold hardship that RCEP might bring Indian farmers, shopkeepers, and medium sized enterprises. On the one hand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's diplomatic predilections wish for this powerful link-up with 'rising Asia', while on the other, domestic considerations urge calm and caution, and circumspection. As of now, the RCEP may be concluded under the aegis of the ASEAN Presidency of Vietnam in February 2020.

Through this period of global turmoil, all are agreed that the WTO is in need of reforms. But they are not agreed on what, where, and how. A worthwhile reform effort, however would need to include all three of the WTO's key functions: administering multilateral trade rules, serving as a forum for such negotiations, and offering a mechanism to settle disputes. There is also the developed-country unhappiness at the decision-making process by consensus, which gives even the least significant member of the organisation an effective 'veto-power'. While President Trump's threat to pull out of the WTO might not actually come to pass given its economic costs in an election year, the rule-based body may be neutered by the raising of tariffs in the name of US national security, and the blocking of the appointments to the WTO Appellate body, effectively rendering it non-functional. The US has threatened these steps, unless guidelines are formulated to prevent high economic growth countries from taking benefits of SDT, by self-declaring themselves as developing countries (China, and South Korea in particular).

The US also wants to return to the non-binding dispute settlement of the GATT era, and has expressed concern about 'judicial overreach' of the Appellate body, seeking its demise simply by not replacing judges. The Indians brought to bear on the process a developing country perspective. Following a Ministers' Meeting of Developing and Least Developed Countries in New Delhi earlier this year, the Indian Trade Minister Mr Piyush Goyal strongly urged that the WTO reform process should not dilute the basic principles such as the providing of special and differential treatment (STD), as well as the rule of consensus in decision making.

China is said to support the reform process, viewing it as an opportunity to play a lead role in it, rather than have the initiative hijacked by others. It wants to link it up with China's domestic policy of "reform and opening up in the new era''. It sees prudence in addressing 'early harvest' first, seeking common ground where possible, and shelving differences. It has identified Appellate Body reforms as a priority area, as evidenced in its position paper on WTO Reforms, and later on Reform proposals issued on 23 November 2018, and 13 May 2019 respectively. Other 'early harvest' subjects are fisheries subsidies, e-commerce, small and medium-size enterprises and investment facilitation. China has shown empathy with the Canada-led 13 party consultation forum, and as a part of Plan B, favours RTAs, in which its own role is key such as the RCEP, and other bilateral and plurilateral arrangements including its "Belt and Road' initiative.

In the long run, the reform agenda should address all three of the organisation's functions. Keeping the global trading order that the WTO represents to prevail should be to the benefit of all, and ultimately one hopes individual self- interest would drive member states to some kind of an agreed arrangement. But there are also low hanging fruits such as in short term reforms like fixing the Appellate Body crisis and the dispute settlement mechanism. This could be more feasible, if a powerful force, such as the Director General is able to knock some heads together. It is generally believed that Mr Trump's rhetoric may drive the membership to finally act on the reforms that have hung fire for so long. As is said, speaking metaphorically of the WTO, shaking a tree would make some fruits, including low-hanging ones, fall. But Director General Roberto Azevedo has warned that shaking the tree too hard could also kill it. Since a dead WTO would lead to more trade barriers, as well as less predictable and enforceable global trading, there is no alternative to keeping the WTO alive. It is possible perhaps to locate a safe passage between Scylla and Charybdis, and the challenge to the world leaders is to find it. Failure, and the resultant chaos in the trading world,is not an option.

Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Principal Research Fellow at ISAS, National University of Singapore, former Foreign Advisor and President of Cosmos Foundation Bangladesh