When Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's immensely skilful stewarding of the process of liberation, and its aftermath the war of 1971, led to the fruition of the Bangladeshi dream, the nation's sovereign independence, the relations with India became the most salient feature of the nascent State's foreign policy. The challenge was stark. It involved Bangladesh's living in concord with, but distinct from, its large and powerful neighbour. The need for 'concord' was a political and geographical imperative and the necessity for being 'distinct' was the justification for separate sovereignty. The process actually began almost immediately with Bangabandhu's call for independence in March 1971, and the formation of the Mujibnagar government in April, following his incarceration in Pakistan.

The impact that the Indian policies had through the unfolding crisis on the Bangladeshi leadership-in-exile in India, was of cardinal importance, as it was certain to have considerable bearing on future bilateral relations. Needless to say, Bangladeshi leaders were profoundly grateful to the Indian authorities for spontaneously providing them refuge, and enabling them to organise a government, even before India was able to formalise its attitude towards the issue, which now appeared to have as its goal the bifurcation of Pakistan. In other words, New Delhi, and the Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi, were confronted with the hard choice of having to act against prevalent global 'club rules' of inter-state relations by openly opting to side with the notion of a dismemberment of a neighbouring State, by no means an easy choice.

Bangladeshi leaders, like Acting President Nazrul Islam and the Provisional Prime minister Tajuddin Ahmed began pressing for formal Indian recognition to their status. On 24th April 1971 Acting President Nazrul Islam in a letter to President VV Giri of India requested that 'immediate recognition' be accorded and 'envoys exchanged'. Mrs Gandhi was caution for two reasons. First, 'interference' in the 'internal affairs' of another country would be a contravention of a key principle of the 'non-aligned movement', by which India placed great store. Second, she appeared to have calculated that Indian recognition might actually hurt the Bangladeshi cause by seeming to substantiate Pakistani allegations that the struggle was being engineered and sustained by India.

Two phases in India's reaction can be marked off. One from March to August was of circumspection. This period was used by Mrs Gandhi for building up of global opinion through diplomatic initiatives and travels, particularly of the Soviet Union, leading to the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. The second was from August to December. This was when the option for action, including the military one was gaining salience, eventually being transformed into the principal strategy. This analysis resulted from the author's long discussions with Mrs Gandhi as a researcher, some years later, in the summer of 1978.

Once India's decision to intervene was firmed up, there were numerous contacts between Bangladeshi leaders, mostly residing in Calcutta, and Indian authorities. The leaders were kept well-briefed by Foreign Secretary TN Kaul and Mr DP Dhar, Mrs Gandhi's close confidant. Provisional Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed and his colleagues developed a good rapport with senior Indians. An exception was Khandakar Mushtaq Ahmed, the eventual architect of the gruesome coup of August 1975 in which Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib and much of his family lost their lives.

The long-awaited recognition of the Bangladesh Government by India finally came on 6 December 1971 as the Indo-Pakistan war began. The delay did not appear to have had any adverse impact on bilateral relations, as the Bangladesh provisional government seemed to understand the ground realities of global politics. However, Laurence Lifschultz, writing in 1979, seemed to have noted some tactical and strategic differences between the Indian fighting forces and the Bangladeshi Mukti Bahini and the regulars in the 'Niyamito Bahini'. Also, immediately after independence of Bangladesh in December 1971 the two sides were locked in a series of tough negotiations over 'prize court' or '(Pakistani) war booties. Also, the agreement in Simla between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972, whereby all 93000 Pakistani prisoners of war including 195 alleged war-criminals were returned to Pakistan caused some heart burning in Bangladesh. The feeling was that Bangladeshis were left with a Hobson's Choice in that regards. To the credit of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, he was able to guide Bangladeshi policy through these complex times (including securing the withdrawal of all Indian forces in three months or so) with a dexterity in which the positive essence of this intricate relationship remained preponderant.

As it does to this day, with intermittent vicissitudes of fortune when there have been trying times. At this time Bangladesh is forging ahead at a remarkable pace on the economic and development front. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has assessed that a friendly relationship with India would provide this positive development an enabling matrix. Hence she had been in the forefront in creating an ambience of close cooperation, and has been generous in her response to Indian needs. She has allowed for transit of Indian goods through Bangladeshi territory and denied any access to use of the country's soil to potential Indian insurgents, particularly from the north-east. A general perception in Bangladesh has been that the return for her generosity has been inadequate. Every mutual high-level visit on the part of either tends to raise expectations, rightly or wrongly, and when these are not met, there is disenchantment, particularly on the Bangladesh side. Water-sharing, particularly of the Teesta river, is an emotive issue that has been hanging fire for a long time, awaiting resolution. The current visit of Sheikh Hasina to India was mainly to attend a World Economic Forum meeting and present Bangladesh's picture of rapid growth to key business leaders. It was a success in that regard. Bangladesh was applauded as an economic 'success-story'.

However, thereafter, the seven bilateral deals signed with India did not generate domestic enthusiasm in Bangladesh, despite their 'win-win' character as described by Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India. There is 'give and take' involved in most international agreements but Bangladeshi public opinion, if social media is an indicator, probably saw more 'give' in those than 'take'. There is also concern in Bangladesh about the National Register of Citizens in Assam declaring 1.9 million people non-Indians, with fears that many of them might seek refuge in Bangladesh. The apprehensions were exacerbated by openly calling the Muslim component 'Bangladeshis', and threatening dire consequences for such illegal immigrants by Mr Modi's deputy, Mr Amit Shah. Even though Bangladeshis can claim a modicum of pride in their largely secular predilections, the fact is that they are overwhelmingly Muslims, and the propagation of Hindutva by India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as an on-going process is severely disconcerting.

Bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India are often driven by a mix of reason and passion. Into this cauldron also flow the complexities of domestic politics on both sides. The constellation of forces for favourable relations is perhaps better now than ever before. In Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh has a motivated leader of deep and mature sagacity. But, where India is concerned, she also has her public opinion to consider. She remains New Delhi's best bet ,and not to take advantage of this reality for India would mean missing out on a rare opportunity.

Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury | Principal Research Fellow | Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore