The US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan met his Indian counterpart Ajit Doval in New Delhi on June 14. Within the outlines of this high-level diplomatic meeting, the point of their discussion turned around various issues relating to the first state visit of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the United States. One of the important issues expected to be discussed in the meeting between PM Modi and US President Joe Biden in Washington is the South Asian neighborhood, with a particular focus on the dynamics within Bangladesh where the next general election is due early next year. During the meeting between Jake Sullivan and Ajit Doval, Mr. Doval expressed hope that the United States will avoid undertaking any initiatives regarding its neighbouring countries particularly Bangladesh that might negatively impact New Delhi's national interest.

It indicates the purposes of Prime Minister Modi's visit: strengthening the bilateral relationship and addressing matters relating to regional security cooperations. It serves not only as a critical role in the Indo-U.S. partnership in the context of Russia Ukraine war and security cooperation under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and Indo-Pacific Strategy, it also assumes significance in preserving and strengthening Modi's domestic political image, particularly before the next election, by strengthening his position and gaining support through showcasing strong international relations.

On the one hand, the United States has expressed its aspirations, which include the expansion of strategic partnerships, the protection of economic cooperation, and the tackling of global challenges such as climate change. On the other hand, India aims to secure increased investments, technology transfers, and collaboration in counterterrorism efforts. Meanwhile, Asian countries like Bangladesh want strengthened regional connectivity, strong economic partnerships, and increased developmental assistance.

Preceding the forthcoming G20 Summit in September, this visit has drawn global attention. It gathers attention due to the fact that, for the past two decades, Washington has made a significant bet on the Indo-Pacific region. The United States sees India as a crucial partner in its geopolitical competition with China and believes that India's role will assist in achieving its objectives in the region.

The underlying difficulty lies in the divergent aspirations of the United States and India regarding their security partnership. The United States, like it does with its allies worldwide, aims to enhance India's position within the framework of the liberal international order and seek its support in collective defense efforts when needed. However, India has a different perspective. It doesn't inherently prioritize the preservation of the liberal international order and is hesitant to engage in mutual defense commitments. India seeks advanced technologies from the United States to bolster its economic and military capabilities, enabling it to independently rise as a major power capable of countering China.

The United States aims to achieve convergence in military-to-military cooperation, seeking to integrate foreign militaries into combined operations as part of coalition warfare. However, India rejects the idea of participating in joint military activities outside the United Nations framework. Unlike countries like South Korea, Japan, and Australia, India's alignment with a U.S. security bloc is highly unlikely unless there is a conflict between the United States and China specifically over the issue of Taiwan. Consequently, India has been cautious about deep operational integration, particularly with the U.S. armed forces, to avoid compromising its political autonomy or signaling a significant shift towards close political alignment with Washington.

India's primary focus has been to obtain American aid in enhancing its own national capabilities, enabling it to address threats independently. Both sides have made considerable progress in this regard, such as strengthening India's intelligence apparatus regarding Chinese military activities along the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean region. While the current intelligence-sharing arrangements are designed for mutual purposes, New Delhi shares any information it considers valuable. However, due to the significantly more advanced capabilities of the United States, the exchange of actionable information often tends to be predominantly one-way.

The United States has expressed concerns regarding India's adherence to the established norms of the current global order and its perceived reluctance to disrupt the geopolitical landscape. Concerns arise from India's reliance on Russian military imports and oil, with Russia surpassing Iraq as its primary oil supplier. Additionally, India's hesitation to unequivocally condemn Russia in the Ukraine conflict remains a point of contention. Furthermore, India's position in the event of heightened tensions or conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains ambiguous.

The Indian government does not consider the concept of mutual defense, which is a significant aspect of bilateral partnerships with the United States, as feasible or applicable to its own strategic approach. While the Biden administration is unlikely to publicly criticize India, members of Congress may not share such reservations.

The relationship between Washington and New Delhi enjoys consistent bipartisan backing within the United States, and is progressively gaining stronger support across the entire spectrum of Indian politics. India's ongoing tensions with China, its regional and global aspirations, and its increasing engagement in multilateral platforms, along with a growing recognition of and reliance on cooperative efforts with the United States in these areas, all point towards a sustained partnership between the two nations in the near future. Prime Minister Modi's first state visit to the United States serves as a significant indication of this trend.

Writer: Researcher and Columnist