The 'First 100 Days' has become a sort of media talking point that any new administration in any country must subject itself to these days, even if the inherent benefits of choosing that timeframe - three months and ten days, has never been clear. It can be a useful time to take stock. But we must be careful not to mix up the standards to which they are held.

The first one hundred days for a government that arrives through an orderly transition is a very different thing to one that is the child of an uprising, of the sort Bangladesh witnessed in July-August. Obviously there is little to no preparation. The first we even heard of the possibility of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus taking over as the head of an interim government after the collapse of the Awami League government last August 5th was deep into the night of that first day in Bangladesh 2.0. We still had no idea of the kind of team he would put together. Once it was formed after Dr Yunus's return from Paris on August 8, you couldn't hold it to an election manifesto. There were no 'campaign promises'.

It was the result of an outbreak, of things reaching a breaking point, and this outbreak meant many different things to many different people by the end. The consensus, at a national level around things we can most agree on, would take time to bake.

Meanwhile we have witnessed, in fact are witnessing still, upheaval unlike anything that a normal, peaceful transfer of power would entail. To say nothing of the regime that fell, and all that came crashing down with it (do they still read Humpty Dumpty to the kids?). Almost the entire police force left their posts. You do reap what you sow. The interim government has voiced lofty ideals, and even loftier ambitions. It is bound to fall short of its initial expectations. What we must all recognise is that whereas the first 100 days of a normal government may be regarded as a time for 'doing', the first 100 days of this interim government has been a time for 'undoing'. Fifteen years of 'state capture', arguably at a level never witnessed elsewhere, was bound to throw up all kinds of obstacles for any succeeding administration to really come into its own.

To say that it is undoing 'Fascism,' a loosely thrown-about term that holds little meaning in contemporary politics doesn't quite cover it. State capture, a far more unwieldy beast that was most explicitly identified in recent times in South Africa under the presidency of Jacob Zuma. But whereas Zuma fell under the spell of one notorious family, the Guptas from Gujrat, India, the Sheikh Hasina regime by the end was serving the interests of an entire coterie, including extended families, cabinet members, close advisers and outside business groups. Many of these actors, and the influence they held, were known to us for years through various leaks and exposed scandals. During these last three months, more and more of these stories have made headlines, as the interim government set about the task of untangling the morass of corruption the last government left behind.

The process of fully untangling from what will go down as a dark period in the country's history, during which the most fundamental aspiration that drove this nation to war in 1971, democracy, was consistently undermined, will take more than 18, 36, or even 54 months to complete. That means we cannot just rely on the interim government, even one led by the most accomplished Bangladeshi in the world, a man who has devoted his life to uplifting the lives of the less fortunate among us, to deliver the change we seek.

The interim government, for its part, may speak the language of reforming the state, but the best that it can actually do is to set us on the road to reform. That ultimately will be the yardstick by which it will be judged. The road it sets us down, not how far we go with it. And beyond that, where we end up, will be left up to us. It has to be of course, through that free and fair election. That obviously will remain the IG's most important promise, for which we must await its final act. For everything else that it tries in between, failure can be excused. On the issue of the election though, it cannot afford to fall short. Nor can this nation.

The road ahead

The interim government has 'a monumental task' before it, according to a briefing report on the first 100 days by the influential Brussels-based think tank, the International Crisis Group. Taking the reins on August 8, three days after a mass uprising ousted the increasingly authoritarian Sheikh Hasina, it said the administration led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus has moved quickly to delineate a bold agenda of political, governance and economic reforms. Many Bangladeshis describe Hasina's downfall as a "second liberation" (a reference to the 1971 independence war), bespeaking the public's appetite for major change.

For now, Yunus and his colleagues have widespread support, the report asserts, but popular expectations are double-edged. If the interim administration falters in making reforms, the outcome is likely to be an early election with little progress; in the worst-case scenario, the military could assume power. ICG advises the interim government should look to score a few quick wins to keep its social support base strong as it builds consensus around key reforms and prepares the country for credible elections. It also urges international actors to back Yunus's administration and bolster the Bangladeshi economy to help inaugurate a new era in national politics.

There is no denying that after fifteen years in office, Sheikh Hasina's administration had grown deeply unpopular. To hold on to power, her government systematically undermined the independence of Bangladesh's institutions, particularly the police, judiciary and bureaucracy. Widespread human rights violations and regular crackdowns on her opponents, coupled with economic mismanagement, stark social inequality and worsening corruption, had weakened support for her party, the Awami League, particularly in the past five years. The party claimed a massive win in the January election, but it owed victory to an opposition boycott and low turnout. In June, a Supreme Court decision reinstating controversial quotas for government jobs provided the spark for student-led protests that ignited the following month.

Hasina's brutal response - including a nationwide internet shutdown and a deadly crackdown - saw the student movement transform into a popular revolt that forced her to flee the country hastily.

The euphoria that accompanied Hasina's departure lingers, but the harsh reality of the road ahead is becoming increasingly clear. Already in bad shape, Bangladesh's economy is limping along, having taken a further hit from more than a month of protests and the uncertainty of the transition. Yunus's team has struggled to restore law and order, dependent largely on a police force that was heavily implicated in the anti-protest repression. Maintaining popular support will be crucial, particularly given the interim government's improvised legal foundations.

Rebuilding the country's institutions will also be no mean feat, and while the interim administration is the most inclusive Bangladesh has ever seen, many of its members have little experience in government or management. Maintaining the backing of key political players is already proving challenging: some stand to benefit from an early election, and even Yunus's allies have divergent views about issues such as constitutional reform and accountability for atrocities committed under Hasina's rule. While Hasina's party is now in disarray, Yunus may also face obstruction from pro-AL factions and individuals.

Experience suggests that the longer the interim government is in power, the louder calls for early elections will get and the larger doubts about its legitimacy will grow.

Managing, let alone meeting, sky-high public expectations will be extremely challenging. Experience suggests that the longer the interim government is in power, the louder calls for early elections will get and the larger doubts about its legitimacy will grow. Yunus will also be forced to take unpopular decisions, including on economic reforms that may hurt vulnerable sections of society and on the extent of accountability for human rights violations committed during Hasina's time in power. Many Bangladeshis want revenge for the AL's abuses, an impulse that Yunus is - rightly - not keen to indulge.

While challenges abound, there is also acknowledgement that the situation presents Bangladesh with an unprecedented opportunity. Since 1990, two parties - Hasina's AL and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) of her fierce rival, Khaleda Zia - have dominated politics, taking turns in government. Both have manipulated state organs, twisted election rules, mobilised party thugs and built patronage networks to cling to power. But Hasina took these tactics to extremes and pushed the Bangladeshi people too far. As a result, she has handed the interim government a once-in-a-generation opening to put in place stronger checks and balances on future governments. The overarching goal of forthcoming reforms is to make sure the authoritarianism and cronyism of the past fifteen years cannot come back.

Even if it is unclear how successful the Yunus team can be in reaching this goal, the alternatives look unappealing. An early election would likely bring the BNP to office with few restraints on its power; given its record, many suspect it would prove little better than the AL. If political and economic conditions were to deteriorate significantly, the army might intervene, beginning a period of military rule.

The best insurance for Yunus's administration against those seeking to undermine it will be to deliver a steady stream of results, enabling it to maintain public support as it embarks on deeper reforms. Quick wins could include steps to address petty corruption in public services, improve electricity supply and reduce high prices. Strong public support for the interim government could put pressure on other political forces, particularly the BNP, to fall into line around its agenda.

In any case, the interim government should be unstinting in seeking consensus among political parties and other key groups, such as the army and students who led the protests that overthrew Hasina. It should balance demands for justice with the need for reconciliation, staying within the bounds of the constitution to mitigate the danger of its decisions being invalidated later. It should also seek to hold fresh elections under a reformed polling system within a realistic timeframe, which should not extend beyond eighteen months - i.e. the first quarter of 2026.

Crisis Group also maintains that foreign governments and multilateral institutions should provide the interim government with technical and financial assistance, including on security, judicial, electoral and economic reform. Foreign governments should also help recover the proceeds of corruption and state-sanctioned theft that are sitting in banks and property markets outside Bangladesh. India, which staunchly supported Hasina throughout her rule, should take steps to repair the resulting damage to its image. Support at home and abroad will be crucial to ensure that Bangladesh does not lose this chance at the political and economic change that many of its people long for.

The Yunus Advantage

Apart from a televised address to the nation on November 17 (see 'Desired elections on completion of necessary reforms'), Chief Adviser Yunus has been talking to various local and foreign media on the occasion of his government's first 100 days. A common theme running through them all is journalists trying to gain a sense of the timeframe the IG is working with, to deliver on its promised reforms leading to the election.

Nick Clark, the Al Jazeera journalist who interviewed him in Baku, Azerbaijan (where Yunus was for COP29), probably came closest when the CA told him: "We are an interim government, not a perpetual one. A regular government lasts five years. The new constitution may say four years, probably because people want it to be faster. So, it should be under four years, that's for sure. It may be less."

In response to Clark's almost excited observation that this tenure is close to an electoral term, Yunus however quickly clarified: "I didn't say that I'll be (heading the government) for four years. I'm saying this is the maximum we can go, but that's not our intention. Our intention is to get it done as quickly as possible."

So we were back to where we started. When asked whether he would stand for election, Yunus was firm: "No, I'm not a politician. I enjoy my role and what I've been doing at this stage of my life. I'm not going to change that."

Ultimately none of them quite succeed in teasing something concrete out of him, and you have to conclude that he himself is not approaching the task with any timeframe in mind.

The government in waiting?

BNP Secretary General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir expressed disappointment over Chief Adviser Yunus's speech marking 100 days of his interim government - specifically over its lack of a roadmap or timeframe for elections.

"While the speech, a well-drafted one, has raised the hopes of the people, I am a bit disappointed. We had hoped the chief adviser, with all his wisdom, would identify the pressing problems and propose a roadmap for elections," said Fakhrul at a discussion at Jatiya Press Club.

"I emphasise elections because holding them would address half of our problems," he added.

Stressing BNP's stance over its support to the interim government, Fakhrul mentioned that his party has not opposed or obstructed any of the recent reform initiatives by them.

"No gap should ever emerge between us and the students. Students have the right to voice their opinions. We have grown older. We are more calculative now. We evaluate which actions can be taken and which cannot, what is appropriate to do now and what is not," he said.

"We believe holding elections quickly is essential for the well-being of the country and its people. This comes from our own experience. This government lacks a mandate. The longer they stay in power, the more problems will arise. This is not an elected government, so where does its strength come from?"

Fakhrul said that his party supports implementing reforms within a reasonable and appropriate timeframe. "It should not take so long that people start to suspect you are trying to cling to power. We have had such experiences in the past," he added.

With AL still unable to muster any presence, the BNP is by far the largest stakeholder among all the political parties currently active in the country. The IG has consistently displayed its desire to keep BNP, widely expected to win the next election, whenever it is held, in good humour. For its own part, BNP, which endured the bulk of the Hasina regime's repression against political opposition, has demonstrated commendable political maturity in not looking to capture the reins of government at the earliest opportunity.

From his base in London, Tarique Rahman, the party's acting chairman, has been able to communicate with an assurance belying his absence of 16 years from the country. Speaking judiciously, avoiding excessive mudslinging, and with a hand clearly always on the pulse of the nation, Tarique has been slowly winning over the people. Even when he has critiqued the IG, he has insisted the national interest lies in seeing it succeed in its mission. For now, any lingering doubts over his acceptability as a future leader of Bangladesh would seem to have been nullified.

While Mirza Fakhrul may bemoan the lack of a roadmap with dates specified, as things stand we do have some idea of what the days ahead will bring. The six most important reform commissions will place their reports to the government by December 31, reflecting people's desire and expectations as the government is committed to build a new Bangladesh.

The commissions-the Electoral System Reform Commission, Police Administration Reform Commission, Judiciary Reform Commission, Anti-Corruption Reform Commission, Public Administration Reform Commission, and Constitution Reform Commission-are now working to produce their recommendations.

Based on the commissions' reports, the next phase of broad-based dialogue and consultation between the stakeholders that include political parties and professional bodies on one hand, and the interim government on the other hand will be held.

By the turn of the New Year, we should be much better placed to envision a timeframe for the eagerly awaited 13th parliamentary election. That is when we look forward to the country being truly delivered back to its people.