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The 29th of February should be a red- letter day for Afghanistan. The long-awaited deal between the United states and Kabul was signed in Doha, Qatar, on that day. Due to it being on a 'leap year', the date can be observed only once in four years. Perhaps this fact meant little to both sides. It is because observations of its anniversaries may become irrelevant, as one consequence of the deal would be that the government of Afghanistan may pass to the Taliban soon enough to make annual celebrations of the kind quite unnecessary.
The Agreement was a step-by-step approach to peace in Afghanistan which has only known conflict over the past four decades. It was a recognition of each side of the significance of the other, as also the insignificance of the government in Kabul. The deal called for the withdrawal of foreign troops in 14 months from Afghanistan if the Taliban upheld the terms of the agreement, some important parts of which were kept secret. The document required the Afghan government, which was not a party to the agreement to release 5000 Taliban prisoners in exchange for 1000 government soldiers held by the Taliban by the start of intra-Afghan talks. As per the agreement, the talks were scheduled to begin on 10th March. Afterwards, the leader of the Taliban delegation, Mr Abdul Ghani Baradar had a phone conversation with President Donald Trump of the US, who enthusiastically described the talk as "very good". The United Nations Security Council also approved the signing unanimously, welcoming the fact that it "aimed attending the long war."
The only plausible interpretation to anyone interested was that the Americans, exhausted from their two-decade long involvement in the conflict were now persuaded that it was time to withdraw. Moreover, recall of the troops was a political commitment of President Trump. , Naturally , he wanted the process to begin before the US elections, come November. The Taliban who already physically controlled large swathes of the country's territory smelt victory. The only thing that stood between them and complete take-over in Kabul was the presence of 12000 American troops. The troops had already started leaving, and the US commitment to have the numbers reduced to 8600 by mid-July seemed already under way. The departure of soldiers from US bases in Lashkar Gah in Helmand and another in Herat showed that they were also keen on closing five bases as they undertook to do within the agreed time- frame. The Taliban continued their attacks on government troops, further destabilizing them, calculating that these show- of- strength would not impact too greatly on the Americans, and would only reflect their burgeoning power.
It now seemed that the Americans were reconciled to a Taliban government in Afghanistan, but one with whom they could enjoy good working relations. Prime Minister Imran Khan, whom President Trump continued to extol even during his recent trip in New Delhi to the chagrin of his hosts, was likely to oversee and ensure the process. Pakistan would stand to gain on several counts. One would be the derailment of the unfriendly government of President Ashraf Ghanie in Kabul; the second would be its replacement by a friendly Taliban who were cool towards New Delhi; and the third, would be the end of Indian influence on its western borders (through which Pakistan suspects anti-Pakistani operations were carried out). The new Afghanistan could be like contemporary Vietnam to America, ideologically still different, but chummy enough to be allies, nevertheless. America's close relations with Islamabad, Prime Minister Khan now having delivered on Afghanistan, could now continue as Pakistan would remain a conduit linking the US to its rival, China. All these were powerful reasons for three key parties- the Taliban, the US and Pakistan- to want to bring a closure to the Afghan imbroglio, under the gaze of a contented China.
But there can be many a slip between the cup and the lip, and some of these calculations could go wrong. Initially, President Ashraf Ghanie, was reluctant to go along. But his re-election was contested by his rival Mr Abdullah Abdullah, who also swore himself in as President the same day as President Ghanie. President Ghanie may have used the prisoner-exchange issue to leverage US support, and having obtained US recognition against Mr Abdullah Abdullah, signed a decree to release a group of 1500 prisoners (for starters). The Taliban, or at any rate pro-Taliban elements, to whom the two non-Taliban Presidents in Kabul were two too many, marked the occasion by exploding a few devices in town, indicating that they were in close proximity watching the evolving chaos, perhaps with a modicum of amusement!
For now, the Afghan imbroglio continues. Though President Ghanie seems to be in charge, the challenge from his Presidential rival is unlikely to end conclusively. As the Taliban awaits to learn as to who their governmental counterparts in the intra-Afghan talks would be, the situation in Kabul remains chaotic. This essay points to the possibility of the turmoil concluding with the Taliban assuming power, with the acquiescence of the US, the delight of Pakistan, the approving nod of China, and to the general relief of much of the world.
But what of the Afghans themselves, a vast majority of whom are young enough not to have actually known the previous Taliban rule? Will it mean the end of their aspirations for progress? Will it spell the doom of, say, women's empowerment, a process that has happily begun in Afghanistan? Will it cut all prospects of enlightened government? One hopes not. The New Taliban should be different from the old. Otherwise, this will be a huge opportunity sadly lost. Afghans deserve better. All with future potential influence- the US, Pakistan, the UN- can prove themselves true friends of the Afghan nation if they can help engender progress with the peace. As the great Afghan novelist Khaled Hosseini has demonstrated in his powerful tome 'The Kite Runner' that the Afghan people share the same aspirations- guilt, friendship, forgiveness and hope -as the rest of humanity and deserve the same chance as us , in their journey along the inscrutable path of destiny.
Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Principal Research Fellow at ISAS, National University of Singapore, former Foreign Advisor and President of Cosmos Foundation Bangladesh.
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