Pakistan's general election on February 8, marred by allegations of widespread voting irregularities, resulted in a hung parliament and the formation of a coalition government consisting of the country's two major dynastic parties. Nevertheless, the outcome represents a stunning defeat for the country's powerful military, as candidates backed by the imprisoned former Prime Minister Imran Khan's Tehreek-e-Insaf Party (PTI) secured more parliamentary seats than any other political bloc despite a two-year crackdown on its voters and supporters.

Although PTI did not win enough seats to form a government on its own, its unexpectedly strong performance - the party was officially barred from participating in the election - underscores Khan's popular appeal. In the run-up to the vote, PTI members and supporters have faced imprisonment, harassment, and the destruction of their businesses. On election day itself, cellular services were disabled in a last-ditch effort to disrupt turnout efforts. But despite these obstacles, Pakistani voters delivered a historic blow to the military, whose political interference met little resistance over the last three decades.

More than a competition between political parties, the Pakistani election represented a confrontation between those who oppose the military's increasingly blatant political meddling and those who collaborate with it to gain personal and professional benefits. But the outcome raises an important question: Why has the regime encountered such widespread opposition now, particularly in regions long considered bastions of military support?

To be sure, PTI's strong showing can be partly attributed to Khan's popular appeal as Pakistan's greatest-ever cricketer and his decision to challenge the military's authority. This defiance led to his arrest and subsequent conviction on corruption charges, for which he is serving a ten-year prison sentence. But it also represents widespread anger among the country's middle class, whose economic and political clout has steadily declined, despite its rapid growth over the past 20 years.

According to economist Durr-e-Nayab, roughly 40% of Pakistan's population could be classified as middle class - a group that has accounted for most of the country's income growth over the past few decades, spreading from urban centers to rural areas, where demand for middle-class goods like motorcycles and TVs has surged. At the same time, the number of private schools has increased dramatically, from 3,000 in 1982 to 70,000 in 2015. More than 34% of school-age Pakistani children currently attend these schools, including many from lower-middle-income households.

Pakistan has also experienced a higher-education boom over the past two decades, with universities sprouting even in remote areas, facilitated by the support of the country's Higher Education Commission. While the quality of the education offered by these institutions is questionable, the surge in enrollment has given rise to what can be described as an "aspirational" middle class. Despite their lack of stable incomes, these households share the same dreams and ambitions as their middle-class counterparts.

Regrettably, the growth model supporting Pakistan's middle class has been built on shaky foundations. The country's economy runs on borrowed resources, relying heavily on regular financial support from the International Monetary Fund and key foreign allies, such as the oil-rich Gulf states and China.

Moreover, the Pakistani economy primarily benefits the country's elites, who extract resources through subsidies, tax exemptions, and various other policies. Tax collection is inefficient and regressive, placing a disproportionate burden on the poorer and productive segments of the population. Meanwhile, the growth of large-scale manufacturing has stagnated, and exports have declined from 15% of GDP in 2003 to 11% of GDP in 2022.

Khan's ouster via a military-engineered no-confidence vote in April 2022 exacerbated Pakistan's already precarious economic situation, setting the stage for a prolonged period of economic and political turmoil. The World Bank estimates that real GDP contracted by 0.6% in 2023 as the economy struggled with rampant inflation and the devastating impact of the 2022 floods.

With the economy stagnating and inflation hovering around 30%, a recent Gallup survey found that public pessimism is at an 18-year high. With roughly 70% of respondents reporting that their economic situation had worsened, widespread economic dissatisfaction helped fuel the electoral backlash against the military regime.

But Pakistan's middle class is grappling not only with diminishing economic prospects but also with political repression. Once dismissed as a "chattering class" who preferred watching soap operas at home instead of voting, middle-class Pakistanis have become more politically engaged and now form the backbone of PTI's base. As the military intensified its crackdown on Khan's middle-class supporters - many of whom are women - the opposition has become more determined, largely owing to the enthusiasm of Pakistan's tech-savvy youth.

In many respects, this was Pakistan's first digital election. Two-thirds of the population is under the age of 30, constituting the "largest generation of young people" in the country's history, according to the United Nations Development Programme. Confronted with a massive and predominantly unsympathetic cohort of new voters, as well as 73 million active social-media users, the regime found it increasingly difficult to shape public discourse.

With official repression raising the costs of collective action, social media has emerged as a powerful tool for mobilizing voters. Following a controversial Supreme Court decision that prohibited Khan's party from using its traditional cricket-bat symbol, supporters flocked to social media to disseminate information about the new symbols assigned to PTI-backed candidates.

Moreover, in a country where rural politics has historically revolved around kinship networks and patronage systems, social media has made it possible for national issues to take precedence over parochial concerns. The longstanding notion that rural vote brokers could secure the support of entire clans is becoming obsolete. Similarly, the unified household vote has disintegrated, with family members now voting according to their own political preferences. Taken together, these shifts severely impede the military's ability to control politics through local notables.

But while the results offer a glimmer of hope, Pakistan's post-election landscape is marked by a volatile combination of diminishing resources, a growing number of stakeholders, and an authoritarian elite unwilling to make any concessions. The government's effort to maintain the status quo through repression has resulted in a historic loss of legitimacy and trust in state institutions. The resulting institutional vacuum leaves middle-class grievances unaddressed, posing a grave threat to Pakistan's stability. In the absence of institutional channels to resolve political disputes, conflicts are bound to be settled through violence.

Pakistan's foreign partners must use their influence to prevent further instability. In two months, Pakistan will have to turn to the IMF and external funders again. Those who control the purse should press the military to loosen its economic and political grip on the country. It is time to empower those who can provide the growth and stability Pakistan urgently needs.

From Project Syndicate